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An Overview of Progress in the International Regulation 
of the Pharmaceutical Industry* 
JOAN COSTA-FONT AND AARON BURAKOFF ** 
INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry, a significant source of healthcare 
throughout the world, has several features that distinguish it from the rest 
of the health industry.  In the last half-century, new technology, better 
technological know-how, and overall economic growth have led to wide-
spread and rapid growth in the pharmaceutical sector.1  Advancements in 
pharmaceutical research and development have led to the production of 
drugs that can routinely combat afflictions that, only years ago, were un-
treatable or even fatal.  Since 1970, the average share of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) on pharmaceutical goods has increased in most Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries by 
approximately 50%, meaning that pharmaceutical expenditure has in-
creased on average 1.5% more per year than GDP growth.2   
Given that access to health care is fundamental to developed society 
and that pharmaceutical goods are a significant source of healthcare, drugs 
should be accessible to everyone across the world.  However, universal 
accessibility to drugs is not an easy feat.  As nations work with their phar-
maceutical industries to provide the best possible access to drugs, they 
must do so on limited budgets and while maintaining proper incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to continue to innovate.  These conflicting ob-
jectives are problems unique to the pharmaceutical industry and critical to 
its successful future.   
  
 * Acknowledgement for financial support to the Weissman International Internship Program 2002. 
 ** Joan Costa-Font (Ph.D., M.Sc., LL.B.) is an Associate Professor of economics at the University 
of Barcelona and a research fellow of health economics and risks analysis at LSE Health and Social 
Care, the London School of Economics.  E-mail: j.costa-font@lse.ac.uk.  Aaron Burakoff (B.Sc.) is a 
graduate student of economics at Harvard University and a research assistant at the University of Bar-
celona. 
 1. Alfonso Gambardella, Luigi Orsenigo & Fabio Pammolli, Global Competitiveness in Pharma-
ceuticals, A European Perspective <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/library/enterprisepapers/ 
pdf/enterprise_paper _01_2001.pdf>  (Nov. 2000). 
 2. This rate of increase, though significant in its own right, is consistent with the rise in overall 
health expenditures. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Health Data 
2002 4th ed. <http://www.oecd.org /EN/document/0,,EN-document-684-5-no-1-29046-0,00.html> 
(version Aug. 20, 2002). 
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In the European Union (EU), major steps are being made to balance 
these objectives through the establishment of a Single Market for Pharma-
ceuticals.  As stated in a Commission Communication on the single market 
in pharmaceuticals, “The purpose of the completion of the Single Market 
in Pharmaceuticals is not just to provide an environment which is favour-
able for pharmaceutical innovation and industrial development, it is also to 
improve consumer choices in pharmaceuticals of the required quality, 
safety and efficacy, at an affordable cost.” 3     
The aim of this note is to present an overview of the major factors that 
are currently shaping and effecting international trade in the international 
pharmaceutical industry, and of how these factors contribute to the EU's 
progression towards a single market.  Through outlining the present status 
of the industry, we hope to facilitate the making of future decisions to 
reach a better balance between industry innovation and healthcare accessi-
bility. 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING PHARMACEUTICAL TRADE 
A Brief History 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), created in 
1944, was the first major set of international trade guidelines established to 
facilitate the growth of a global economy.  The GATT centered on building 
mutually advantageous agreements to promote international trade and to 
eliminate discrimination between nations.  In order for the GATT to con-
tinue to liberalize trade as the economy developed through the years, con-
tracting parties took part in eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.  
The longest lasting and most ambitions of these rounds, the Uruguay 
Rounds, were completed in 1994 with the establishment of the new World 
Trade Organization (WTO). 
The WTO is the institutional successor to the GATT.  The GATT was 
simply a treaty signed by a group of nations and adhered to depending on 
the degree to which each nation committed itself.  Conversely, the WTO 
binds all of its Member States to a series of multilateral agreements and 
provides an optional set of plurilateral agreements.  The contents of the 
GATT, including modifications and revisions, still remain as one of the 
multilateral agreements within the WTO.  Also under the auspices of the 
WTO, with implications in the healthcare industry, are the General Agree-
  
 3. European Union, Commission Communication on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals 
<http://europa.eu.int/ comm/enterprise/library/lib-regulation/doc/com-98-588_en.pdf> (Nov. 25, 1998). 
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ment on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT), the Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreements (SPS), and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). The TRIPS Agreement, which signified the first recognition of 
intellectual property rights as a fully-fledged trade related issue, is the chief 
method of protection for pharmaceutical innovation and the aspect of the 
WTO that this article is most concerned with.           
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
The TRIPS Agreement defines the guidelines that Members must fol-
low in setting up systems to protect intellectual property rights.  Unlike the 
other WTO rules, which describe what countries cannot do, TRIPS is pro-
scriptive.  It states what countries must do.  Member States must grant pat-
ents for a minimum of twenty years to the invention of a pharmaceutical 
product or process that exhibits novelty, inventiveness, and usefulness.  
Before TRIPS, many States did not issue patents for pharmaceuticals in 
their territory, which meant that the inventor had no particular right over 
his invention in that country, which led to the proliferation of copies of 
patented drugs in some countries.  The lack of adequate protection was the 
driving force behind the establishment of TRIPS.4   
It is important to stress the significance that patent protection has on 
continued pharmaceutical innovation and the creation of new drugs.  De-
veloping new drugs is a costly and extremely risky business, for not all 
new drugs are guaranteed to produce profits.  In fact, studies have identi-
fied that most drugs fail to recoup their research and development expenses 
and that a very small amount of so-called “blockbuster” drugs are neces-
sary to repay the losses on the majority of low-payoff products.  For this 
reason, patent protection is essential to recoup the expenses involved in 
developing new medications.  Research and development managers have 
recognized the importance of maintaining patent protection, identifying it 
as more important to attaining profits than any other single factor. 
Accordingly, all industrialized WTO Member States have recognized 
the TRIPS Agreement since the start of 1996 and by 2005, all developing 
nations under TRIPS will have to grant legal protection by patents to 
  
 4. South Centre, Main Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement <http://www.southcentre.org/publica-
tions/trips/ tripsmaintexttrans-02.htm#P282_33352> (accessed Sept. 2002). 
5. South Centre, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries 
<http://www.southcentre.org /publications/trips/tripsmaintexttrans-04.htm#P482_63629> (accessed 
Sept. 2002). 
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pharmaceutical products.5  Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that the 
protection of intellectual property rights in TRIPS is not an end in itself, 
but merely part of a set of broader economic objectives.  Article 8 (pertain-
ing to public health) of the Agreement reads:  “Members may, in formulat-
ing or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to 
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological de-
velopment, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions 
of this Agreement.” 6  It is with this concept underlying the TRIPS Agree-
ment that Member States can utilize various measures, such as compulsory 
licensing, parallel imports, and Bolar provisions to increase drug accessi-
bility at lower costs during periods of patent protection. 
Compulsory Licensing, Parallel Imports, and Bolar Provisions Under the 
TRIPS Agreement 
By definition, a compulsory license is a license granted by a judicial or 
administrative authority to a company to produce patented medicines with-
out permission from the holder.  Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement stipu-
lates that companies, after unsuccessfully attempting to receive a voluntary 
license from a patent holder, may be given a compulsory license to pro-
duce patented drugs when the practices of the patent holder are deemed to 
be anti-competitive or when the intentions of the licensee are for non-
public use of the product.  According to a report issued by the World 
Health Organization, compulsory licenses are the most effective method to 
increase the supply of products because they deter patent holders from 
arbitrarily reducing supply or artificially increasing prices.  
However, interested parties have recognized that WTO Members with 
insufficient manufacturing capacities could face difficulties in implement-
ing compulsory licenses.  Article 31(f) mandates that the license be used 
only for domestic use, which is not economically feasible in many devel-
oping countries.  Furthermore, despite its potential to increase drug access, 
the importance of compulsory licensing seems to be declining as modern 
firms tend to transfer technology through direct investment, either through 
joint ventures or fully-owned subsidiaries. 
Parallel imports are generally defined as the importation into a country 
where a patent has been registered for the same product patented and le-
gally marketed in another country. Parallel importing, another method 
  
  
6.  South Centre, Main Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement <http://www.southcentre. org/publications 
/trips/tripsmaintexttrans-02.htm#P279_33310> (accessed Sept. 2002). 
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compliant with the TRIPS Agreement, works to increase both supply and 
price competition where patented medicines in one country are imported 
into another country and then sold in parallel with the same home-patented 
product.  In many places, including the European Community, parallel 
importing is not only permitted, but national antitrust authorities actively 
take steps to prevent manufacturers from impending parallel imports.  Ac-
cordingly, many European countries have significant trade in pharmaceuti-
cal parallel imports.     
Though parallel imports are a significant source of price competition, 
their usage implies a conflict between competing EU goals.  On one hand, 
the principle of subsidiarity allows each Member State to set its own phar-
maceutical prices (this, in fact, is why there are different prices in different 
countries and why parallel trading can exist).  On the other hand, the prin-
ciple of free trade permits traders to arbitrage price differentials and reduce 
revenues earned by the pharmaceutical companies.  The fact that most of 
the profit in parallel trade goes to the arbiter, rather than the health care 
system or the patient, is an inefficiency cited by critics of parallel trading. 
Another flaw in parallel importing is that it works against basic eco-
nomic theory in recouping research and development costs.  Critics argue 
that pharmaceutical research and development is a global joint cost that 
benefits consumers world wide, and that price differentiation is the best 
way to cover the joint costs of the research and development.7  Since paral-
lel trade erodes the price differences, it undermines the price mechanism 
that pays for research and development.  
In September 1999, a “joint understanding” was reached between the 
U.S. and South Africa to enable the latter country to provide affordable 
health care to its citizens. The South African government introduced the 
Medicines Act that would allow parallel imports and compulsory licensing. 
The joint understanding concluded that the Act would not impede South 
Africa from honoring the terms of the TRIPS Agreement.  The joint under-
standing followed after four years of negotiation and lobbying, both be-
tween and within the two countries, which notably, was conducted outside 
of the WTO dispute settlement process.8 
Nevertheless, parallel trade does exist, and therefore presents several 
possible scenarios for pharmaceutical manufacturers.  Manufacturers must 
look to avoid launching new drugs in markets where prices are expected to 
be low.  If extensive practice of parallel trade emerges, it is possible that 
  
 7. Keith E. Maskus, Parallel Imports in Pharmaceuticals: Implications for Competition and Prices 
in Developing Countries <http://www.wipo.org/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_maskus_pi.pdf> (accessed 
Jan. 2003).  
 8. Gordon Nary, Sloppy Homework <http://www.thebody.com/iapac/edit899.html> (August 1999). 
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manufacturers will choose not to launch their products in certain countries 
where the prices are too low, or in the most extreme scenario, manufactur-
ers might discontinue research and development in countries where prices 
are highly regulated and shift activities to countries with high prices.  Such 
an event would lead to over-concentration in countries such as the United 
Kingdom or Germany.  
In the U.S., Canada, Australia, and other countries, experiments and 
tests required to secure regulatory authorization to market a generic drug 
can take place and applications for approval can be submitted prior to pat-
ent expiry without the consent of the patent.  These patent infringement 
exemptions are termed the Roche-Bolar provisions (or Bolar provisons).  
Roche-Bolar provisions, so named after the 1984 U.S. case of Roche Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Company,9 were introduced into U.S. 
legislation as part of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act.10  The provisions allow 
generic firms to compete in the post-patent market almost immediately 
following patent expiry.  Bolar provisions allow for the use of a patented 
invention, before the expiration of the patent, in order to prepare a generic 
version of the drug to be ready for production and distribution once the 
patent has expired.  Bolar provisions currently exist in the U.S., Canada, 
Israel, and Australia, where, in exchange for the Bolar provisions, the pat-
ent holder is granted an extension on the patent.  Though EU countries do 
not have Bolar provisions, an EU ruling confirmed that early work on a 
drug is consistent with the TRIPS, but that stockpiling before the expira-
tion of the patent is not.    
Bolar provisions facilitate a common global trend to cut costs by en-
couraging the use of generic medications that are much cheaper to produce 
than their brand-name predecessors.  Indeed, many OECD countries have 
established a variety of policies and financial incentives to promote generic 
prescription.  Seeing that generic drugs tend to enter the market at whole 
sale prices only 40-70% of the original patented drug prices, the push to-
wards generics has become and will continue to be an important factor in 
cutting healthcare costs. Due to the provisions of Article 28, providing that 
a patent confers on its owner certain exclusive rights, and Article 30, al-
lowing exceptions to the exclusive rights, it is not clear whether Bolar pro-
visions are in compliance with the TRIPS agreement.  In particular, what 
constitutes a legitimate exception is not set out explicitly.  This ambiguity 
favors generic medicine manufacturers in countries where Bolar provisions 
  
 9. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Company, 733 F. 2d 858 (1984). 
 10. Consumer Project on Technology, The Hatch-Waxman Act and New Legislation to Close Its 
Loopholes <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/generic/hw.html> (accessed Sept. 2002); see also The 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417 (1984), 1984 
Stat. 1538. 
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do exist, and is a bargaining platform for the generic industry in countries 
where Bolar provisions are not permitted.  That is, the generic industry in 
these countries may argue that adopting Bolar provisions would not in-
fringe on international regulations for intellectual property.             
Taken together, developing countries believe that compulsory licens-
ing, parallel importing, and Bolar provisions are an intrinsic part of the 
balance in the TRIPS Agreement.  Yet, despite the legitimacy of these 
measures, some Member States that have applied one or more of them 
have faced the threat of unilateral retaliations or the suspension of aid by 
developed nations.  In developing countries, where there are currently in-
sufficient funds and opportunities for significant pharmaceutical innova-
tion, it will be important to monitor how accessible drugs will be for them, 
especially after the forced implementation of patent protection in 2005. 
Exclusive Marketing Rights 
Article 70.9 if the TRIPS agreement establishes the right of a patent 
holder to obtain exclusive marketing rights.  This would allow for patent-
holding companies, who have filed an application for a patent in a WTO 
Member State, to market their product without market competition for a 
period of five years or until the patent application is decided.  Article 70.9 
states that pending the grant of a patent, exclusive marketing rights shall be 
granted during the transitional period to patent recognition, as from the 
time the invention receives marketing approval.  The conditions are that a 
marketing authorization for that same product must have been obtained in 
another Member State and a patent for the product must have been granted 
in that same State.  Here, there is a well-known dispute between the U.S. 
and Argentina.  The U.S. alleges that in Argentina, there is an absence of 
an effective system for providing exclusive marketing rights in pharmaceu-
ticals.  The United States contends that the TRIPS Agreement does not 
permit WTO Members to allow third parties to market products subject to 
exclusive marketing rights without the consent of the right holder.  Also, 
according to the United States, Argentina's law does not provide a system 
that conforms to Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with regard to the 
grant of exclusive marketing rights. 
Reaction to the TRIPS Agreement 
Unsurprisingly, overall reaction to TRIPS is mixed.  Advocates of the 
Agreement believe that we will see an increase in the flow of technology 
transfer and direct foreign investment for the benefit of developing coun-
tries.  Accordingly, they expect the increase of resources allotted to re-
search and development in developing nations to result in the development 
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of more drugs suited to their own needs.  As stated by Harvey Bale, on 
behalf of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association: 
In the future, TRIPS rules can be expected to spread the applica-
tion of research more globally and involve local companies and 
countries which have not been part of the effort to discover new 
treatments, cures and preventive vaccines.  Also, international 
companies can be expected to increase investment and partnerships 
with locally-oriented companies, where the lack of patent protec-
tion and the prevalence of counterfeiting has hindered such activi-
ties until now.11   
Furthermore, when patent protection is guaranteed in developing na-
tions, TRIPS proponents expect to see an end to the "brain drain" because 
intelligent and productive workers from developing nations will no longer 
need to leave their home countries because their work will be protected at 
home.  On the opposing side, critics believe that the strengthening of pat-
ents will only increase the prices of patented drugs.  These critics expect 
that the increase in prices will coincide with a concentration of production 
in industrialized countries, where multinational firms will have the free-
dom to export finished or semi-finished products rather than transfer their 
technology directly to the developing countries.  They find it hard to be-
lieve that the TRIPS provisions will lead to an increase of research and 
development by enterprises in developing countries because, despite patent 
protection, these countries will still have to deal with a lack of technical 
infrastructure and human resources.12 
Compliance with Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 
The U.S. and the European Community (EC) have filed complaints 
against India concerning India’s implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.  
An agreement has been reached between India and the U.S. for an imple-
mentation period of fifteen months expiring on April 16, 1999.  The EC 
established an agreement for the implementation period to correspond to 
India’s agreement with the U.S.  At the dispute settlement board (DSB) 
meeting on April 28, 1999, India presented its final status report on imple-
mentation of this matter, which disclosed the enactment of the relevant 
legislation to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.  
  
 11. Harvey E. Bale, Consumption and Trade in Off-Patented Medicines 
<http://www.icrier.res.in/pdf/bale65.PDF> (May 2001). 
 12. Ummy Ally Mwalimu, Implications of WTO/TRIPS in East Africa- With Special Emphasis on 
Pharmaceutical Patents <http://www.esrftz.org/global/output/glob007.pdf> (April 15-16, 2002). 
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India has also been the subject of complaint by the EC and the U.S. 
over an alleged absence in India of patent protection for pharmaceutical 
and agricultural chemical products and the absence of formal systems that 
permit the filing of patent applications and provide exclusive marketing 
rights for such products.  The EC and the U.S. contend that this is inconsis-
tent with India's obligations under Article 70, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the 
TRIPS Agreement.13  The Dispute Settlement Panel found that India has 
not complied with its obligations under Article 70.8(a) or Article 63(1) and 
(2) of the TRIPS Agreement by failing to establish a legal basis that ade-
quately preserves novelty and priority in respect to applications for product 
patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical inventions.  India was 
also not in compliance with Article 70.9 by failing to establish a system for 
the grant of exclusive marketing rights. 
THE DOHA DECLARATION 
Recently, in the Doha WTO ministerial 2001, the WTO recognized 
that the gravity of public health problems (mainly HIV but also tuberculo-
sis and others) afflicting many developing and least-developed countries 
might require taking an international action, which implies the introduction 
of the so-called “flexibilities.”  However, at the same time, these actions 
involved recognition that they might cause difficulties to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry.  To this extent, the Council for TRIPS is instructed to find an 
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council 
before the end of 2002.  The following flexibilities are under consideration: 
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tional law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the 
light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particu-
lar, in its objectives and principles.  
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted. 
c. Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood 
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculo-
sis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
  
 13. World Trade Organization, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips.doc> (Apr. 15, 1994). 
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d. The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are rele-
vant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each mem-
ber free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, 
subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.14 
The Declaration later states: 
We also agree that the least-developed country members will not 
be obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement 
or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to 
enforce rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 
2016, without prejudice to the right of least-developed country 
members to seek other extensions of the transition periods as pro-
vided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.15 
THE EU AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PUSH TOWARD A SINGLE 
MARKET 
Though we have already described several elements of the TRIPS 
Agreement and how they factor into the EU pharmaceutical market, there 
are other important features to discuss regarding the creation of the EU 
Single Market for Pharmaceuticals.  Specifically, several recent court rul-
ings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have significant implications 
for the free movement of pharmaceutical goods throughout the EU.16 
The ECJ has made clear through its rulings that it is dedicated to the 
promotion of the free movement of goods and services.  One such ruling 
by the Court granted patients permission to import over-the-counter medi-
cations for their own use from a pharmacy in another country, provided 
that the product is authorized in their home country.  Then, in the Decker 
Case (Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives, C-120/95 
(European Court of Justice, 1997)), the ECJ ruled that a social security 
organization's refusal to reimburse goods purchased in another Member 
State opposed the Treaty of the EU.  In Raymond Kohll v. Union des 
Caisses de Maladie, C-158/96 (European Court of Justice, 1998), the Court 
  
 14. Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
<http://www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm> (Nov. 14, 2001). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Working Group on “Pharmaceuticals and Public Health” of the High Level Committee on 
Health, Pharmaceuticals and Public Health in the EU: Proposals to the High Level Committee on 
Health for Policies and Actions in the Framework of the Treaty of Amsterdam  
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph/key_doc/ke02_en.pdf> (Mar. 28, 2000).  
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made a ruling that implied that purely economic aims cannot justify a bar-
rier to the fundamental principle of free movement of services.17    
In addition to the progress made by the Court rulings, the usage of the 
Euro, a common currency throughout much of the EU, significantly facili-
tates the movement of goods across borders.  The single monetary union 
pushes towards price transparency and contributes to easier price compari-
sons across countries.     
There is much to be gained by the completion of a single market for 
pharmaceuticals in the EU.  As stated in the Commission, “The continued 
differences between European markets lead to excess costs (such as higher 
marketing costs, higher distribution and administrative costs) and, in some 
cases, to excess production capacity, that could be off-set by a better oper-
ating (single) market.”  Accordingly, policy makers and the ECJ must con-
tinue to facilitate the development of the single market.18 
CONCLUSION 
Many changes in the past decade, including the TRIPS Agreement and 
several rulings by the ECJ, have significant implications for the future of 
trade in the international pharmaceutical industry.  However, it is important 
to emphasize that trade regulation is only one of the many aspects to be 
considered to gain a full understanding of the nature of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  It is expected that trade regulation will be considered by individ-
ual countries within the contexts of their own healthcare systems and their 
own necessities.  Proper patent protection, along with some limitations in 
such forms as compulsory licensing, parallel imports, and Bolar provisions, 
will contribute to the shaping of a market in which continued innovation 
and especially increased access to pharmaceutical products can benefit all 
nations. This has been the motivation of recent changes in the regulation of 
patent protection worldwide as a result of the Doha declaration by stating 
that, “International trade can play a major role in the promotion of eco-
nomic development and the alleviation of poverty.”19  
A potential argument in favor of patent recognition often cited by the 
multinational pharmaceutical companies is its positive impact on the trans-
fer of technology to the developing world. However, the evidence suggests 
otherwise.  Typically, pharmaceutical plants are dismantled by foreign 
  
 17. European Union, supra n. 3. 
 18. Working Group on “Pharmaceuticals and Public Health” of the High Level Committee on 
Health, supra n. 15.  
 19. Doha WTO Ministerial 2—1, Ministerial Declaration <http://www.wto.org/English/thewto 
_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm>  (November 14 2001). 
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subsidiaries of multinational companies after the introduction of pharma-
ceutical patents.  In these cases, medicines are brought into the country in 
finished form and subsidiaries act as distribution centers only. However, 
even when patent protections are not helpful for technology transfer, they 
might be helpful for fighting disease when pharmaceutical research is fo-
cused on the specific health problems of developing countries, as well as 
the ones of developed countries.  An alternative regulation proposal refers 
to setting up a legal framework that ensures a system of differential pricing 
that would guarantee access to drugs under patent to those individuals in-
fected by specific diseases.  However, international regulation of trade still 
demands higher development. Current TRIPS regulation setting specific 
barriers to parallel trade and to implementing a patent policy should be 
made consistent with providing incentives for pharmaceutical companies to 
commercialize drugs for “less profitable diseases.” 
 
